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RECENT DECISIONS
JUDGMENT - DOMESTIC RELATIONS - COLLATERAL ATTACK. -
This is an action to obtain a decree to the effect that defendant does
not have any interest in a mortgage held in the name of plaintiff's
intestate and the defendant or their survivor. It is alleged that the
defendant induced plaintiff's intestate to take an assignment of this
mortgage in their joint names by falsely representing herself to be
his lawful wife when in fact she had another husband living and
undivorced, she having obtained a decree under Section 7A of the
Domestic Relations Law 1 from her prior husband by false testimony.
The question presented is whether the decree referred to could be
attacked collaterally in this proceeding. Held, where the court had
proper jurisdiction and the only grounds for the collateral attack was
the alleged perjury of the defendant, the judgment of dissolution of
the defendant's prior marriage can not be attacked collaterally.
Arcuri v. Arcuri, 265 N. Y. 358, 193 N. E. 174 (1934).
In the interests of public policy, a limitation 2 is placed on a
collateral attack upon a judgment.3 In general, the grounds on which
a judgment may be thus assailed are fraud and want of jurisdiction.4
The fraud which will permit one court in a collateral proceeding to
review the judgment of another tribunal is fraud practiced in the
procurement of the judgment, by which one party was prevented
from availing himself of some evidence. 5 However, the authorities
are in accord that perjury is not such fraud as will permit a col-
lateral attack on a judgment where the court rendering such judg-
ment had proper jurisdiction. 6 This represents the New York law,7
CoNs. LAWs, C. 14.
-The limitation is designed to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, and finds its expression
in the maxim: "Interest rei publicae, ut sic finis litiun; nenow debet bis vexari
pro ina et eadam causa." United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878).
'Aparicio v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 551, 164
N. Y. Supp. 114 (1st Dept. 1917), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 69, 117 N. E. 1060 (1917);
New York Central R. R. Co. v. Harrold, 65 How. Pr. 89 (N. Y. 1883).
' Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535, 542 (1871) : "It is a rule well settled,
that every judgment may be impeached for fraud, and this applies as well to
judgments of our own State, as to those of other States or foreign judgments;
but what will constitute fraud sufficient to vitiate a judgment, and who can
make the objection, and under what circumstances it can be interposed, are
material questions." Ruger v. Heckel, 85 N. Y. 483 (1881).
'Kinnier v. Kinnier, supra note 4, at 542, 543; Mayor, et at, of the City
of New York v. Brady, 115 N. Y. 599, 22 N. E. 237 (1889). STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §1575, states: "It seems to be conclusively settled that a
judgment can only be impeached in a court of equity for fraud in its concoc-
tion. If, then, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction can only be
enjoined in a court of equity upon the ground of fraud, this fraud must have
been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment, or else it will be
concluded by the judgment at law where there is equally a defense as in equity."
'United States v. Throckmorton, supra note 2, 98 U. S. at 66, whereat the
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that "the doctrine is * * * well settled
that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a
fraudulent instrument or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was
actually presented or considered in the judgment assailed."
7Ross v. Wood, 70 N. Y. 48 (1877) ; Gitler v. Russian Co., 124 App. Div.
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supported by early authorities,8 and other jurisdictions 9 in well-nigh
unanimous array.10 Recent decisions 11 reaffirm the rule so ably
stated by the Lord Keeper in the time-honored case of Tovey v.
Young, decided in 1702.12
Further, where the court once acquires competent jurisdiction
over the parties 13 or the subject matter,14 and there is no fraud in
the procurement of the judgment, no collateral attack is allowed.
This rule is likewise founded on early authorities,' 5 and has been
followed consistently in New ,York,16 as well as in other states.' 7
The doctrine of respecting judgments of other courts jurisdiction-
ally competent has been approved innumerable times by the United
States Supreme Court,'8 which even extends the rule so as to in-
clude foreign judgments.' 9
273, 274, 108 N. Y. Supp. 793, 793 (1st Dept. 1908), wherein the court said:
"While equity will sometimes intervene to set aside a judgment obtained by
fraud or unfair practices, it will not do so where the only fraud alleged is
that it was procured by perjured testimony." Therein it was charged that
the plaintiff who was called and sworn as a witness upon the inquest, testified
falsely respecting the value of the goods which were the subject of the action.
A demurrer to the defense was sustained.
'Michigan v. Phoenix Bank, 33 N. Y. 9 (1865); Patch v. Ward, L. R. 3
Ch. App. 203; Dobson v. Pearce, 2 Kern 156; STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§1581 et seq.
'Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray (Mass.) 361, 362, wherein Chief Justice Shaw
said: "But where the same matter has been actually tried, or so in issue that
it might have been tried, it is not again admissible; the party is estopped to
set up such fraud, because the judgment is the highest evidence, and cannot be
contradicted."
"0 Contra: see WELLS, REs ADJUDIcATA §499: "There is an old case in
South Carolina to the effect that fraud in obtaining a bill of sale would justify
equitable interference as to the judgment obtained thereon. But I judge it
stands alone or quite alone, and has no weight as a precedent."
' Crouse v. McVickar, 207 N. Y. 213, 100 N. E. 697 (1912).
1 The rule is of ancient vintage, it having been well said by the High
Court of Chancery, Pr. Ch. 193, that "New matter may in some cases be
ground for relief, but it must not be whqt was tried before; nor, when it
consists in swearing only, will I ever grant a new trial, unless it appears by
deeds, or writing, or that a witness on whose testimony the verdict was given
was convicted of perjury, or the jury attainted." This decision was followed
in New York in the early case of Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch. 320 (N. Y.
1814).
"Rupp v. Rupp, 156 App. Div. 389, 141 N. Y. Supp. 484 (2d Dept. 1913).
" Garfein v. McInnes, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928).
"Bateman v. Willoe, 1 Scho. 8 fLef. 201, where Lord Redesdale said: "I
do not know that equity ever does interfere to grant a new trial of a matter
which has already been discussed in a court of law, a matter capable of being
discussed there, and over which the court of law had full jurisdiction."
" Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1930) ; Sorenson v.
Sorenson, 219 App. Div. 344, 220 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dept. 1927).
"' Borland v. Thornton, 12 Cal. 440 (1859); Riddle v. Baker, 13 Cal. 295
(1859); Dixon v. Graham, 16 Iowa 310 (1864); Cottle v. Cole & Cole, 20
Iowa 481 (1866).
" UNITED STATES CONST. Art. IV, §1; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S.
155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (1901) ; Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct.
679 (1905) ; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906).
"Supra note 18; Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 328 (1884);
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To permit collateral attacks on judgments on grounds other
than fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction 20 would leave
a court without capacity to settle definitely any suit brought before
it, and would render judgments insecure and uncertain. New evi-
dence, confessions of perjurers, mistaken testimony, etc., if permitted
to overthrow a judgment once competently made, would keep law-
suits alive ad infinitum.21
J. E.F.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-BANKRUPTCY AS CONDITION SUBSE-
QUENT OR CONDITIONAL LImITATIoN.-Defendant, assignee of a
lease, was adjudicated bankrupt. Said lease contained a clause "that
an adjudication that the lessee is bankrupt shall ipso facto end and
terminate this lease and any rights thereunder." It was further
provided that the "lessor at its option may rescind and terminate this
agreement upon * * * the breach of any of its conditions, or any of
the covenants or agreements of said lessee." This suit is brought
for rents accruing between the adjudication of bankruptcy and the
disaffirmance of the lease by the receiver. Held, the provision for
a termination of the lease upon the adjudication of bankruptcy con-
stituted a conditional limitation terminating the lease and all obliga-
tions thereunder upon its happening. Murray Realty Co. v. Regal
Shoe Co., 265 N. Y. 332, 193 N. E. 164 (1934).
Parties to a lease may create a conditional limitation by pro-
viding for the termination of the leasehold estate upon an adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy of the lessee.' To effect such result, it is requisite
Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157; Harvey v. Farnie, 8 App. Cas. 43. In
Cottington's Case, 2 Swanston 326 (1678), Lord Chancellor Nottingham in
the House of Lords said: "It is against the law of nations not to give credit
to the judgments and sentences of foreign countries, till they be reversed by
the law, and according to the form, of those countries wherein they were
given. For what right hath one kingdom to reverse the judgment of another?
And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be reversed? And
what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should serve us so
abroad, and give no credit to our sentences." The New York cases are in
accord. Guggenheim v. Wahl, 203 N. Y. 390, 96 N. E. 726 (1911).
mSupra note 4.
"Dickens, in Bleak House, writes of the case of "Jarndyce v. Jarndyce,"
which was litigated for four generations over a period of eighty years. Might
not any case in the courts today equal, if not surpass, Dickens' case in
longevity, in the event that the rule for attacking judgments collaterally were
extended?
2Jane v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420, 122 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1910) ; Lichtenstein
v. Groton Laundry Service, 123 Misc. 942, 206 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1924) ; In re
Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
